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Introduction
Over the last two and a half centuries, since the very beginning of the industrial revolution, the bulk of industrial activities and the associated growth of the world economy have relied on brown energy delivered by the intensive exploitation of nonrenewable fossil fuels. It is now widely recognised that, should the economic system continue to go the brown way, the planet would run out of nonrenewable polluting resources in a matter of generations; exactly how many is a matter of opinions and estimates, but compared to the farthest future, it is certainly too small a number. Additionally, future generations would inherit a planet which would be not only depleted of its pristine stock of resource, but heavily and perhaps even irreparably trans…gured for the worse by climate change.
So, the question is whether a mix of private incentives and public policies may avoid the realization of this scenario. In this paper we model this interplay to show that there may exist a way of combining pro…t incentives and policy tools to open up a green production path.
The key question is: will a number of energy-intensive industries, or even the whole world economy put itself on a sustainable growth path? 1 Is there any hope that large populations of pro…t-seeking corporations will indeed turn themselves green as a reaction to a changing landscape, by positively responding to the introduction of new regulatory instruments building up binding limits to the environmental impact of …rms'activities?
According to the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991), we may expect pro…t-seeking …rms to behave like that, expecting to be better o¤ if they do so, under appropriate policy stimula.
Over more than two decades, the Porter hypothesis (PH, hereafter) 2 has generated a lively trend of thought about the existence of promising links between public environmental concern and …rms'green strategies (or the lack thereof). The foundation of this debate asserts the possible existence of positive private returns to pollution control investment, possibly large enough to more than o¤set the cost of compliance. If this is true, then a win-win solution triggered by environmental regulation and driven by …rms' reaction to it is in fact within reach. The essence of the PH boils down to the 1 Here, 'sustainable' means not necessarily altogether green but simply 'low carbon', as the basic requirement boils down to reducing the emission rate of production and consumption activities to a level compatible with the environment's capability of absorbing and recycling CO 2 and other greenhouse gases, as it did for ages before the beginning of the industrial revolution. idea that strict but ‡exible environmental regulation encourages innovations enhancing competitiveness and contributing to make …rms more pro…table, and therefore happy to deliver a socially e¢ cient outcome such as a clean (or at least cleaner) environment, as a by-product of their own private incentives. Porter and van der Linde (1995a,b) in particular, claim that pollution is often a waste of resources. Under certain conditions, reducing the latter may drive an increase in …rms' productivity and pro…ts. Regulations therefore may ultimately help …rms by unlocking unexpected pro…t opportunities. 3 With this in mind, Porter and van der Linde's (1995a,b) view privileges market-based instruments (like emission taxes and the costly allocation of pollution rights) rather than command-and-control instruments (like environmental standards).
The stream of research generated by Porter and van der Linde (1995a,b) has investigated two di¤erent versions of the PH. The weak one claims that …rms do respond to environmental regulation by investing in R&D for green (either abatement or replacement) technologies, which in turn may not lead to higher pro…ts. The strong version of the PH says instead that one of the consequences of environmental policy is indeed that of increasing …rms'pro…t perspectives. 4 Obviously, the strong version has generated a debate which would not have stemmed out of the weak alternative formulation, the reason being that conventional wisdom has it that, in general, limiting …rms' freedom should ultimately compromise their performance (cf. Palmer et al., 1995) . Hence one could say that, in a way, the e¤ective merit of Porter and van der Linde's (1995a,b)
papers has been that of convincing businessmen (among whom the PH is receiving a growing amount of attention) as well as policy makers about the potentially pro…cuous nature of environmental regulation.
If put into being, the virtuous mechanism embodied in the strong version of the hypothesis would produce a win-win outcome in which both a cleaner environment and a higher …nancial performance would go hand in hand, as a result of the reciprocal alignment of private (pro…t) incentives and social (welfare) incentives.
A distinctive feature of the PH is that it does not necessarily require any consumers' environmental awareness, relying primarily on pure pro…t incentives towards 3 Since Gore (1993) , politicians have viewed the green economy as a chance for growth and competitiveness for the industry. See also Wagner (2003) . 4 A third version of the PH is known as narrow, and claims that ‡exible policy instruments outperform command-and-control instruments as for the resulting innovative incentives perceived by …rms. For more on di¤erent formulations of the PH, see Ja¤e and Palmer (1997 tion of the eco-friendly technology among companies, a …rm unilaterally may lose pro…ts due to higher costs (which represents a direct e¤ect) and reduce market share due to higher product prices (which is a strategic e¤ect).
Unlike much of the current literature on environmental issues, including the PH, the present analysis sets aside the assumption of environmental awareness. Our intention is to emphasize the possibility to obtain bene…cial impacts from regulation simply due to the spontaneous …rms's reaction to an environmental policy, the latter being not ampli…ed or accompanied by any environmental consciousness on the part of consumers.
No variations in demands or information of green technology adoption are needed, and we will assume that the representative consumer is characterised by a concave utility function where there is no room for the environmental impact of either consumption or production. Our point simply rests on the streamlined background idea that competitive pressure intensi…ed by regulation pushes innovation and the resulting mechanism yields a Pareto e¢ cient outcome for …rms and society alike. Hence the PH in its strong version does not hold in general, its emergence depending on the type of environmental innovation applied.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The outline of the setup is in section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis of coalition stability. Section 4 illustrates the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the strong formulation of the PH to emerge at equilibrium. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
The model
Consider a static market with n 2 …rms competing à la Cournot-Nash. 6 Firms supply a homogeneous good, whose demand function is p = a Q; where a is a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price and Q = P n i=1 q i aggregates all …rms' individual output levels q i . Firms can be of two types, either brown or green. A brown …rm uses a polluting production technology and bear an emission tax rate t > 0 imposed on each unit of output. Conversely, the production of green …rms does not a¤ect the environment, so that no taxation is levied on them. However, green companies face an investment costs k to implement their green production technology, and their marginal cost is higher than the one of brown …rms. Without loss of generality, we normalise marginal production cost of a brown …rm to zero, whereas the marginal production costs of a green …rm are c 2 (0; a). This assumption re ‡ects the higher cost of environmentally friendly resources in the real world. Reports from many countries show that, for instance, the energy produced with on/o¤shore wind and photovoltaics/thermal solar, is more costly than the energy obtained from coal or natural gas. 7 Before market competition takes place, each …rm decides whether to be brown or green. Suppose that the industry is populated by 1 m n green …rms and n m brown …rms. The demand function is thus:
where subscripts b and g mnemonic for brown and green, respectively. The pro…ts of a green …rm are de…ned as follows:
while those of a brown …rm are
In the remainder, we shall assume a > t > c. This assumption ensures that (i) the reservation price is large enough for both types of …rm to be viable, and (ii) it may be convenient for a …rm to be green (otherwise, for any t < c; it would not be convenient to opt for the green technology). As it is usually assumed, the environmental damage S is a quadratic function of the quantity produced by brown …rms:
where v is a positive parameter.
Total tax revenue is T = t n P b=m+1 q b , whereas consumer surplus is measured by CS = Q 2 =2. Hence, social welfare is de…ned as the sum of industry pro…ts, consumer surplus and tax revenue, minus the environmental damage:
Stability analysis
To begin with, it is worth noting that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this industry is equivalent to that emerging in a situation in which there are two sets of asymmetric …rms endowed di¤erent marginal production costs. Here, one is indeed a production cost while the other is mimicked by the emission tax rate. The market equilibrium is thus identi…ed by the following pair of output levels:
for each of the m green …rms and n m brown ones. The resulting individual equilibrium pro…ts are
given two generic groups of size m and n m; respectively. The next step, which drives us into the real of coalition theory, consists in taking the fully brown industry where m = 0 as a benchmark, to examine the stability of the grand coalition made up by n brown …rms, in view of the incentive for a …rm to become a green singleton. Fixing, respectively, m = 1 in (8) and m = 0 in (9), we obtain the following pro…ts expressions:
which measure, respectively, (i) the performance of a single …rm becoming unilaterally green, and (ii) that of each …rm in the brown grand coalition. There exists an incentive to abandon the brown grand coalition unilaterally if and only if the following expression is positive:
Observing (12), we may claim
Lemma 1
The brown grand coalition is unstable for all k 2 0; k ; where
This implies that if the R&D cost of developing the green technology is su¢ ciently small, one has to expect unilateral deviations from the status quo ante in which all …rms share the brown technology and bear the emission tax. This produces the additional question about how many …rms will indeed choose to go green.
In order to determine the equilibrium partition of the population of …rms between the brown and green types, we resort to a stability condition borrowed from coalition theory and used in the literature discussing the optimal size of a cartel facing a competitive fringe, as in d 'Aspremont et al. (1983) , Donsimoni (1985) , Donsimoni et al. (1986) and Thoron (1998) .
We take as the object of our interest the stable green coalition of size m 1. In the present model, a partition fm; n mg with m green …rms and n m brown ones is stable if no green …rm desires to become brown (internal stability) and at the same time no brown …rm desires to shift to green (external stability).
Consider …rst the internal stability criterion. For the green coalition of size m to be stable, there must exist no incentive for any of its member to deviate unilaterally and join the brown coalition. Let
denote the pro…ts of a brown …rm, when a single green …rm quits the m-sized green coalition to become brown, thereby increasing the numerosity of the brown coalition to n m + 1:
Likewise, one can easily compute the pro…ts of a green …rm when a brown …rm changes its type becoming a green one, thereby increasing the size of the green coalition to m + 1 :
Hence the stability conditions for a market structure with m green …rms and n m brown …rms are: (
A coalition is de…ned as internally stable if and only if, for m 1, the pro…ts of each single green …rm associated to other m 1 green …rms are higher than those the same …rm would attain by moving from the green coalition towards the alternative brown coalition. Conversely, a coalition of m green …rms is de…ned as externally stable if and only if, for m n 1, there is no incentive for a …rm in isolation to move from the brown coalition towards the green one. We already know from Lemma 1 that the degenerate coalition consisting in the singleton m = 1 is externally stable for all k 2 0; k . We are about to show that, provided the cost associated with green R&D is not too high, the stability conditions (15) are simultaneously veri…ed by some admissible values of m at least equal to one and at most equal to n. To this aim, de…ne as (i) m I the maximum value of m such that internal stability holds, i.e., ; and (ii) m E the minimum value of m above which external stability holds, i.e.,
The following lemma applies:
Proof. The …rst di¤erence related to the internal stability shows that:
if and only if
In turn, m I 1 for all k 2 0; k .
External stability requires
which holds for all
In turn,
Note that sign
with (2t a c) = (t c) < 2 always because a > c. Therefore, b k is positive everywhere. Now observe that the di¤erence between the two critical levels of the R&D cost k is equal to 
Green grand coalition and social optimum
In this section, we illustrate the conditions according to which the PH emerges in its strong version, and we determine the welfare properties of the grand coalition made up by n green …rms.
To begin with, consider that, since m I m E = 1; n 2 [m E ; m I ] is the necessary and su¢ cient condition to ensure that the grand coalition m = n will indeed be the unique stable one. Now let a I be the lowest level of the reservation price above which m I > n, and a E the highest level of the reservation price below which n > m E , respectively. The following holds:
Proposition 2 For k 2 0; min n b k; e k o and a 2 (a I ; a E ) ; the grand coalition consisting of n green …rms is stable.
Proof. The comparison between m I with n yields:
This di¤erence is positive for all
Then, comparing n with m E , we obtain:
A su¢ cient condition for the r.h.s. of (24) to be positive is:
Finally,
which is true for all k 2 0; e k ; where e k 2n (t c) = (1 + n) 2 : Comparing e k against k and b k; one …nds that k > e k everywhere, while b k e k has the same sign as 2 (a c) + (n 6) (t c) ; (27) which is surely positive for all n 6 but may change sign if industry concentration is su¢ ciently high.
The foregoing analysis has been carried out identifying thresholds for k below which (i) a green coalition of size m is stable, and (ii) the grand green coalition m = n arises, possibly yielding a vindication of the PH in its strong formulation. Hence, one could say that the level of green R&D costs has a pivotal role in shaping the behaviour of …rms.
This, true as it may be, would leave aside the role of emission taxation. Indeed, the critical thresholds for k are de…ned in terms of fa; c; n; tg ; i.e., the exogenous parameters and the policy instruments in the hands of the government. For any triple fa; c; ng and any k > 0; the policy maker can in fact manipulate t so as to satisfy the two crucial conditions highlighted in Propositions 1-2, by …ne-tuning the emission tax rate in such a way that k < e k; thus driving …rms towards the generalised adoption of the green technology.
We are left with one last task, which consists in checking whether a green grand coalition is indeed socially e¢ cient industry con…guration. 
Consider now that the pro…t function in equilibrium is equal to: The vertical dashed lines at t = c and t = a delimit the admissible range. The starred area above the horizontal axis, below the lower envelope of n e k; k ; k o and such that t 2 (c; a) ; identi…es the region we are looking for, in which the green grand coalition m = n is socially e¢ cient and is indeed delivered by …rms'incentives. That is, the starred area is where the strong version of the PH obtains and delivers a win-win solution.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the presence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly where the adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We have identi…ed the conditions on the two key parameters of the model, the emission tax and the exogenous R&D cost of obtaining the green technology, under which the green grand coalition is stable and generates a win-win solution.
The conditions emerge in equilibrium if the amount of the R&D cost is relatively contained. This result validates the Porter Hypothesis in its strong formulation, i.e., the introduction of an environmental policy may in fact increase …rms'pro…ts. Finally, the paper evaluates the conditions on the R&D cost under which a green grand coalition is also socially e¢ cient industry con…guration.
An important point is that our results did not rely on the standard assumption on consumers' environmental awareness. This shows that competition intensi…ed by regulation is su¢ cient to push green innovation and in turn pro…ts. We hope our …ndings will inspire a new, sustainable design of industrial and regulatory policies.
